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Least-Cost Avoidance: The Tragedy of Common
Safety
Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci*
Amsterdam Center for Law and Economics and Tinbergen Institute
Nuno Garoupa**
University of Illinois College of Law and IMDEA

This article shows that the least-cost avoider approach in tort is not necessarily
the optimal way to attain least-cost avoidance when accidents can be avoided
by either of two parties. When parties do not observe each other’s costs of care
at the time of the accident and are unable to determine which party is the leastcost avoider, they fail to anticipate the outcome of the adjudication. Under these
circumstances, accident avoidance becomes a commons problem because
care by each individual party reduces the prospect of liability for both parties.
As a result, parties suboptimally invest in care. We show that regulation removes
this problem and is superior to tort liability both when parties act simultaneously
and when they act sequentially. We further examine how different liability rules
perform in this respect. (JEL K13, K32)

1. Introduction
When accidents can be avoided by either of two parties, it seems obvious to
place liability on the least-cost avoider, that is, the party who could have prevented the accident at the lowest cost.1 This approach is unanimously
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recognized as desirable because not only does it induce parties to prevent accidents but also it forestalls wasteful caretaking by the party with the highest
costs of care or, even worse, caretaking by both parties. However, in most
accident contexts, parties act rapidly, do not know each other, or do not have
time to communicate.2 Thus, they may not know who the least-cost avoider is
and consequently fail to anticipate the outcome of adjudication. As a result, the
incentives generated by liability are distorted. In this article, we show that, in
general, regulation provides better incentives than ordinary liability rules and
further compare several different liability rules and regulation in terms of
incentives, administrative costs, and information requirements.
The interest for least-cost avoidance typically arises in a subset of accident
contexts within the standard model of bilateral accidents. In the latter, the
expected accident loss is a function of both the injurer’s and the victim’s care.
We have joint care when the parties’ care expenditures are complements and
alternative care in the opposite case, when care expenditures are substitutes
and, hence, more care by one party makes care by the other party less productive.3 In such general terms, this distinction has only been deemed relevant
when a party fails to take appropriate care and the question arises whether
the other party should respond by reducing or increasing his or her precaution.4
By restricting the focus somewhat further, additional issues emerge. Within
the alternative-care model, we can isolate those cases in which care expenditures are perfect substitutes: if a party takes care, the socially optimal
level of care by the other party is zero. Least-cost avoidance (or cheapest
cost avoidance, as it is often called) refers to those cases, in which both parties
can take precaution but only one of them—the least-cost avoider—should
do so.5
Examples abound: collisions between two parties (a diver and a swimmer in
a swimming pool, two barges at sea, two cars going in the same direction, and
similar cases in which it is sufﬁcient that either party changes his or her speed
or trajectory), rescue (two bystanders on opposite sides of a river where a person is drowning), the use of dangerous products (the producer can make safer
products or the user can use them with some caution), or contract drafting (the
drafter can make the contract language clearer or the counterpart can read it
more carefully). Compared to the general model of joint care or (imperfect)

2. See Calabresi and Melamed (1972) and Kaplow and Shavell (1996).
3. In the standard model, it is usually assumed that the expected accident loss lðx; yÞ is a strictly
convex function of the parties’ care expenditures x and y and that the total social loss is simply the
sum lðx; yÞ þ x þ y, minimized by ðx*; y*Þ. With lxy < 0, we have joint care; lxy > 0 implies alternative care; lxy ¼ 0 yields independence of the parties’ care.
4. See Wittman (1981), Shavell (1983), and Grady (1988).
5. In the standard model, this situation corresponds to either ðx* > 0; y* ¼ 0Þ or ðx* ¼ 0;
y* > 0Þ, where ‘‘least cost of care’’ can be interpreted as ‘‘most effective care given the same
cost.’’ Note that this is different from unilateral accident models in which we have either lx ¼
0 or ly ¼ 0, that is, only one party can take care while the other is passive. Obviously, in this
case the problem of duplicative precaution does not arise. See Landes and Posner (1987:60–1)
and Shavell (1987:17–8).
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alternative care, these circumstances magnify two aspects of the problem: duplicative care expenditures have the greatest negative impact on welfare and
parties have the strongest incentives to free ride on each other’s care.6 These
issues make least-cost avoidance of special interest to the analyst and call for
further investigation, a task that we take on in this article.
The notion of least-cost avoidance has appeared before American courts in a variety of cases,7 although at times the courts frame this concept in a different language, such as ‘‘best position to avoid the accident’’8 or ‘‘most efﬁcient cost
avoider,’’9 regularly citing Judge Calabresi’s seminal contributions.10 Some commentators have argued that the least-cost avoider approach is the key to understanding liability, emphasizing the importance of allocating liability to the best
informed party.11 Nevertheless, the literature has not emphasized that information
on the probability and magnitude of the harm is not enough for a party to take
socially optimal care under the least-cost avoider approach; parties also need to
know each other’s costs of care.12 The cost of care to different individuals may
greatly vary, and an explicit agreement between the parties about who should take
care is deemed impossible by hypothesis in tort cases, due to high transaction
costs. It is our objective both to elucidate how this information deﬁcit compares
to other informational shortcomings already accentuated in the literature and to
examine different possible solutions to this problem.
The difﬁculties that arise while designing liability rules for least-cost avoidance are twofold. First of all, any rule that takes into account the parties’ costs of
6. In marginal terms, least-cost avoidance simply means that the next marginal increase in care
should be made by the party with the lowest cost of care compared to the beneﬁt of care (see, for
instance, Diamond and Mirrlees [1975] and Dnes [2005:133]). In such an interpretation least-cost
avoidance is a mere synonym of optimal accident deterrence, without reference to whether care
expenditures are substitutes or complements, which is instead crucial in our framework. Throughout the article, we will therefore adopt the more restrictive notion outlined in the text.
7. Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 558 (1974); Unites States v. Tex-Tow Inc., 589 F.2d 1310
(1978); Wilson v. Good Humor Corp., 757 F.2d 1293, 244 U.S.App.D.C. 298 (1985); Telxon Corp.
v. Hoffman, 720 F.Supp. 657 (1989); American Telephone and Telegraph Co. v. United Artists
Payphone Corp., 1990 WL 200653 (S.D.N.Y.); Employer Ins. of Wausau et al. v. Occidental
Petroleum Corp. et al., 978 F.2d 1422 (1992); National Union Fire Insurance Co. of Pittsburg
v. Riggs National Bank of Washington, D.C., 5 F.3d 554, 303 U.S.App.D.C. 302 (1993); Edwards
v. Honeywell, Inc., 50 F.3d 484 (7th Cir. 1995); Holtz v. J.J.B. Hilliard W.L. Lyons, Inc., 185 F.3d
732 (7th Cir. 1999); Hamilton v. Accu-Tek Corp., 62 F.Supp.2d 802 (1999); Extrusion Painting Inc.
v. Awnings Unlimited Inc., 40 Fed.Appx. 97 (2002).
8. RyanStevedoringCo.v.Pan-AtlanticS.S.Corp.,350U.S.124,76S.Ct.232,100L.Ed.133(1956).
9. United States v. Jackson, 32 F.3d 1101 (1994).
10. Usually, Calabresi (1970) and Calabresi and Hirschoff (1972).
11. De Geest et al. (2002) argue that doctrines of misunderstanding in Belgian contract law may
be interpreted as identifying the ‘‘least-cost avoider of misunderstandings.’’ Gifford (2005:618,
663) observes that manufacturers are routinely found to be the least-cost avoiders in product liability cases. Gilles (1992) distinguishes between the least-cost avoider test used in Calabresi and
Hirschoff (1972), referring to the party best suited to apply cost-beneﬁt analysis, and the least-cost
avoider criterion, referring to the party best suited to act on the basis of cost-beneﬁt analysis.
12. Calabresi and Klevorick (1985:587) and Harel and Jacob (2002:14) note this point and
suggest that liability should be allocated entirely to one party. We show below that this is not
necessarily optimal.
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care makes use of information that is available at the moment of adjudication but
was unavailable ex ante when the parties decided whether to take care. The ex
post use by the courts of information that was unavailable ex ante to the parties is
known in the literature to generate inefﬁcient results.13 Fines are levied ex ante
on the basis of information available at that time and hence are immune from this
problem. However, making a ﬁnding of negligence exclusively dependent on
information available ex ante, thus disregarding information available ex post,
is shown below to be still inferior to regulation due to a second problem. Since
the accident can be avoided by either party, any rule that conditions liability on
the occurrence of accidents opens up free-riding possibilities for the parties.
When a party takes care without knowing who the least-cost avoider is, he
or she reduces both his or her own expected liability and the expected liability
of the other party, giving rise to a tragedy of common safety14 and to the consequent undersupply of safety. This outcome does not only occur when parties
take care sequentially but also occurs with simultaneous decisions if parties cannot be identiﬁed ex ante. Fines are immune from this problem because they are
imposed whenever an individual violates a rule of conduct, irrespective of
whether this behavior results in an accident.
In these respects, our analysis yields different results from existing literature
because it deals with a speciﬁc kind of information. We consider lack of information on the parties’ costs of care (their types),15 whereas existing literature
considers lack of information on the probability and magnitude of accidents16;
the due-care standard17; or the causal link between accidents, injurers, and victims.18 In these settings, the free-riding problem described above does not appear; hence, the various solutions proposed in the literature rightly revolve
around the idea of basing liability on information available ex ante. In the following, we will comment on some speciﬁc issues related to our analysis.
13. See Ben-Shahar (1998). Calabresi and Klevorick (1985) suggest that using information
available ex post may induce technological advances, but Brown (1985) argues that courts are
well suited to adapt the law but not the precaution technology. Rabin (1985) argues that courts
rarely use information only available ex post.
14. The ﬁrst economic study of this problem is Gordon (1954). The term tragedy of the commons was made popular by Hardin (1968). Establishing property rights through a system of tradable permits to pollute does not necessarily mitigate the problem. In cases in which two potential
injurers interact only once (as it is the case in most of the examples in the text), tradable rights
would not be feasible for the presence of transaction costs. Moreover, tradable rights need to be
build upon an already existing regulatory framework that sets maximum emission limits and only
remedy the regulator’s lack of information on the injurer’s costs of care. See Section 4 on this point.
15. Emons and Sobel (1991) and Ganuza and Gómez (2003) study traditional bilateral accidents with heterogeneous parties. These papers differ from our analysis in that in the former paper
information on the parties’ type is unavailable both ex ante and ex post, whereas in the latter paper
the problem if whether the courts excuse a party’s lack of information. Shavell (1980) shows that
liability rules fail in the control of activity level because relevant information available ex ante is
unavailable ex post, the opposite of what we assume.
16. See Brown (1985), Calabresi and Klevorick (1985), and Rabin (1985).
17. See Grady (1983), Calfee and Craswell (1984), Craswell and Calfee (1986), Edlin (1994),
and Ben-Shahar (1998).
18. See Delgado (1982), Rose-Ackerman (1990), and Marino (1991).
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1.1 Regulation versus Liability

Our analysis yields that imposing ﬁnes through regulation may be superior to
tort liability in dealing with least-cost avoidance. To our knowledge, this issue is
novel in the literature on regulation versus liability, which has mainly focused on
the advantages of regulation in dealing with judgment proof injurers or disappearing defendants and in reducing the uncertainty accompanying negligence
standards.19 Our analysis emphasizes instead an advantage of regulation in
an environment in which parties are timely sued, able to pay the judgment,
and accurately informed on the negligence standard. Our points are independent
of the relative advantages of regulators and courts in gathering information about
the accident context and the parties’ types; nevertheless, we will discuss in some
detail the information requirements of the various policy solutions we analyze.
A word of caution should be introduced here about our optimism concerning regulation. We acknowledge that other potential problems with regulation (e.g.,
capture by private parties) are not addressed here. Hence, we might describe
our regulatory regime as the ideal public regulation framework.
1.2 Embedding the Least Cost Avoider Approach in Ordinary Liability Rules

Looking more closely at tort liability, it is important to note that not only does the
least-cost avoider approach relate to the least-cost avoider doctrine but also it can
be embedded into any negligence rule by reducing to zero the due level of care for
the highest cost avoider party, and hence it is a rather far-reaching and general
concept.20 Consider, for example, a rule of simple negligence under which the
injurer pays damages to the victim if and only if the injurer is found negligent.
If, after examining the accident context it appears that the victim is the least-cost
avoider, then the optimal due-care level for the injurer must be zero. Therefore, the
injurer will never be found negligent and thus the victim will bear the loss.
Likewise, the same logic holds for comparative negligence, under which
a negligent injurer pays compensatory damages to the victim only if the victim
is found nonnegligent and only a share of them if also the victim is found negligent. If the injurer is the least-cost avoider, the optimal care level for the
victim is zero and hence the victim is never found negligent. As a result
the injurer is held liable for the entire harm whenever he does not take the
required level of care. Similar considerations may be made for any other liability rule that makes use of the negligence inquiry.21 We will analyze both
negligence rules based on the least-cost avoider approach—determining
19. Wittman (1977) ﬁrst analyzed this issue in terms of information, insurance, and transaction
costs. Shavell (1984a) compared liability and regulation with respect to information, insolvency,
apprehension rates, and administrative costs. Rose-Ackerman (1991) and Innes (2004) also analyzed this problem. Shavell (1984b), Kolstad et al. (1990), Burrows (1999), Schmitz (2000), and
De Geest and Dari-Mattiacci (2007) deal with liability and regulation combined.
20. For a different interpretation, see Calabresi and Hirschoff (1972) and Gilles (1992), who
consider the least-cost avoider approach under the heading of strict liability. For the sake of our
argument, this is just another way of looking at the problem. Instead of determining whose party’s
level of care should have been positive, as under the negligence approach that we are describing,
the legal system selects the party to be considered strictly liable.
21. See Chung (1993) noting this point.
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negligence on the basis of information available ex post on the parties’ costs of
care—and negligence rules that only make use of information available ex
ante. We will also consider the sharing of the loss irrespective of fault22; this
approach is different from comparative negligence, under which liability is
allocated upon fault. Under sharing irrespective of fault, instead, liability is
shared between the parties according to some exogenous proportions, independent of the parties’ costs of care. Further, we study the doctrine of last clear
chance,23 which allocates responsibility to the party who could have last taken
care in order to avoid the accident, and, hence, only applies to accidents in
which parties act sequentially. All of these rules generally fail our objective.
There exist, however, a way to make liability generate optimal incentives for
both parties to take care. The tragedy of common safety arises, as we have
stipulated, from the fact that care measures have a private cost but produce
common beneﬁts. Fines solve this problem by transforming the parties’ objective from avoiding the accident loss (a common bad) to avoiding a ﬁne (a private bad). Precaution cost liability does the opposite, since the beneﬁt of care is
accrued by both parties, and so should be the cost. Under precaution cost liability, a rule similar to those proposed by Professors Wittman24 and
Levmore25 in contexts that are different from ours, a party is entitled to recover
22. Sharing in tort law is mainly taken into account among faulty parties; see Bar-Gill and BenShahar (2003) for a recent review. Calabresi and Cooper (1996) argued that sharing irrespective of
fault is in fact an increasingly common rule and that it may have an advantage over all-or-nothing
arrangements. Parisi and Fon (2004) take into account the sharing of the loss among nonnegligent
parties, in a framework labeled as comparative causation. To our knowledge, however, the application of a sharing rule to least-cost avoidance in alternative-care cases is novel in the literature.
See nevertheless the related discussion in Calabresi (1970:259–61).
23. See Davis v. Mann, 10 M&W 546, 152 Eng.Rep. 588 (1842).
24. Wittman (1981) focuses on accidents between parties acting sequentially, in which incentives for both parties to take optimal care contrast with incentives for the second mover to make up
for the ﬁrst mover’s possible lack of care. See also Rose-Ackerman (1989). In our framework
precaution cost liability is shown to dominate other liability rules also when parties act simultaneously and our results are only related to the main goal of providing optimal incentives. Harel and
Jacob (2002:36–7) argue that precaution cost liability could be a possible solution to the dilution of
incentives in alternative-care cases when multiple parties are involved; however, they do not provide a formal proof of their claim. See also the discussion by Dharmapala and Hoffman (2005).
25. Levmore (1994) analyzes contractual relationships in which an unanticipated event makes
it useful that one party take precaution to protect the other party, without previous agreement to do
so and outside the scope of the contract, as in Leebov v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co.,
165 A.2d 82 (Pa. 1960). This is efﬁcient in the sense that the parties would have agreed to it if they
had had time to discuss the issue. Levmore asks whether the law should oblige the party to take
precaution or allow that party to claim restitution of precaution costs. Levmore favors the latter
arguing that obligation (the tortlike remedy) to take precaution might result in errors or in excessive
precaution and hence higher contract prices ex ante. Our analysis yields that restitution coupled
with tort liability is superior to the use of tort liability only, in this sense supporting Levmore’s
claim that restitution should be used, but it also shows that an obligation enforced by regulation is
equally effective and does not require restitution. The Leboov case and similar cases are, however,
different from our focus as it seems clear at the outset that a speciﬁc party was the least-cost avoider
and that parties knew that ex ante. We mainly deal with cases in which this information is missing.
Moreover, our framework is not well suited to ask the related question of whether restitution should
follow unsuccessful attempts to prevent the accident. See also Epstein (1994).
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his or her care costs from the other party. In this way, the costs of care are borne
by the least-cost avoider irrespective of which party initially made those
expenditures. Since the beneﬁt of reduced liability accrues ex post to the
least-cost avoider, when he or she also pays the cost of it, this liability rule
produces the same optimal incentives as ﬁnes.
In sequential-move accidents, the optimal precaution cost liability rule
requires instead the ﬁrst mover to refund the costs of care of the second mover,
irrespective of who was the least-cost avoider. Since it is always socially optimal that the second mover makes up for the ﬁrst mover’s lack of care, this
liability rule makes the ﬁrst mover perfectly internalize the costs of care by the
other party and hence yields an efﬁcient outcome. However, precaution cost
liability may be difﬁcult to apply in ordinary tort cases, as it requires compensation both when an accident occurs (compensation for harm) and when it does
not occur (restitution of precaution costs).26

1.3 Salience

When parties do not know each other’s costs, salience may help avoiding that
both parties take care or that no one does: one party is somehow (even arbitrarily) singled out among the group of potential injurers. Some commentators27 have argued that salience is, in fact, implemented in tort law. Our
analysis is different from previous analysis on salience both with respect to
the methodology we use, as we analyze this problem through the lens of a formal model, and with respect to the results we derive; namely, salience induces
corner solutions (only one party takes care under all circumstances), whereas
we show that corner solutions are not necessarily optimal and that it is generally desirable that both parties take care up to some thresholds. This is so
because the need to avoid the accident must be balanced against the costs of
care by the highest cost avoider.

1.4 Signaling

Another important related topic is the possibility of credible signals by the
highest cost avoider in order to induce the least-cost avoider to take care.
If high care costs can be credibly signaled before the accident, the information
asymmetry is reduced and the least-cost avoider approach is potentially efﬁcient. In some contexts, the government has regulated the production of these
signals (e.g., ambulances, ﬁreﬁghters, or police cars). We could even reinterpret state immunity from liability for accidents as an example of signaling
high-cost avoidance (assuming for the sake of the argument that in most
26. In insurance and contract cases, reimbursement of costs of care is easier to implement—for
example, through sue-and-labor clauses. Nevertheless, when there is a contract between the parties,
it is plausible to assume that parties’ will reveal or otherwise discover each other’s type. Therefore,
such cases typically fall outside the scope of our analysis.
27. See Harel and Jacob (2002).
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accidents the state is the highest cost avoider). The characteristics of some
highest cost avoider cannot be easily emulated such as, for example, age (children or senior citizens), a handicap, or size (large boats in the context of international maritime law); in many other cases, however, low-cost individuals
can easily imitate high-cost individuals thereby undermining the credibility
and effectiveness of signaling.

1.5 Policy Makers’ Incentives

A last comment concerns the policy maker’s incentives to implement the optimal regime. It has been noted that the goal of efﬁcient accident prevention
may conﬂict with the reduction of the number of accidents.28 Policy makers
may prefer reducing the number of accidents over minimizing the total social
costs as the former policy yields more visible achievements. In our model, this
aspect may be relevant in two different ways. First, different policies that yield
the same social cost may yield different frequencies of accidents. In this case
the policy that leads to fewer accidents will be more likely to be implemented.
However, there is also a second possibility: an inefﬁcient policy may be preferred to a more efﬁcient one. For example, attributing liability entirely to one
party (a solution that can be implemented by sharing irrespective of fault with
shares equal to one and zero, respectively) always yields no accidents. But this
may not be the best solution for the purpose of minimizing the social cost, as
our analysis shows.
The next several sections contain a formal analysis of this problem both
when parties simultaneously take care and when they move sequentially; in
each case, ﬁrst we show that ﬁnes achieve the social optimum, then we analyze
the performance of liability rules. Section 2 presents the model of parties who
take care simultaneously; Section 3 contains the model of parties who take care
sequentially; Section 4 discusses the information requirements of ﬁnes and of
the different liability rules; and Section 5 concludes.

2. The Model with Simultaneous Moves
We consider a simple model with two risk-neutral, utility-maximizing parties
who are strangers to each other: a victim, who suffers harm, and an injurer.
Both of them can take care, but one party’s care is enough in order to prevent
an accident. Parties decide whether or not to take care and, if so, they incur
a ﬁxed cost that exogenously depends on their types. Note that, contrary to
standard bilateral care models, in the least-cost avoidance model care is a discrete, binary variable rather than a continuous variable and if either party takes
care there is no accident.
Individuals’ types (their costs of care) are distributed according to two probability density functions. Each party knows his or her type and both probability
distributions, but he or she does not know the other party’s type. The harm is
28. See Dari-Mattiacci and De Geest (2005).

Least-Cost Avoidance

243

assumed to be constant and positive. The law determines each party’s sanction
for failure to take care in terms of a ﬁne or of a share in the harm. Let
h 2 ð0; NÞ be the harm and c 2 ½0; h be the cost of care,29 which is independently distributed according to the parties’ probability density functions fi(c)
and cumulative distributions Fi(c), with i 2 f1; 2g; fi(c) is a continuously differentiable function over 0  c  h, positive over the same interval, and zero
elsewhere, with Fi(0) ¼ 0 and Fi(h) ¼ 1. Note that in general the parties’ density functions are not the same.
The social cost is deﬁned as the sum of the parties’ care costs and the
expected harm.30 The ﬁrst-best social optimum is a state of the world in which
the least-cost avoider takes care in each speciﬁc case. This article precisely
deals with situations in which this is not the case because, even if the costs
of care are veriﬁable ex post, at the time of the accident each party ignores
the other party’s cost of care, and hence, they cannot coordinate their actions.
Thus, we are looking for a second-best policy to minimize the expected social
cost. This problem is equivalent to the problem of determining two thresholds
of care, c1 and c2, such that the parties take care if their costs are lower than or
equal to those thresholds.
We begin by assuming that parties can be identiﬁed as party 1 and as party 2
ex ante31; thus, the thresholds can be conditioned on some salient characteristics
of the parties (for instance, c1 applies to bicyclists and c2 to truck drivers). In
addition, we assume that the parties’ care costs are veriﬁable ex post before the
court or by the regulator (although they are ex ante unobservable for the parties).
Later we relax these assumptions and look at situations where parties cannot be
identiﬁed ex ante (thus, c1 and c2 must be equal) and at situations where the
costs of care are not veriﬁable ex post. Legal rules will be evaluated on the basis
of the care choices they induce, which determine the resulting social cost.
The expected social cost may therefore be written as follows:
ð c1
ð c2
cf1 ðcÞdc þ
cf2 ðcÞdc þ ð1  F1 ðc1 ÞÞð1  F2 ðc2 ÞÞh:
ð1Þ
Sðc1 ; c2 Þ ¼
0

0

The ﬁrst two terms in equation (1) are the expected costs of care when parties
take care up to thresholds c1 and c2, respectively. The last term is the expected
29. Note that we have assumed that the costs of care are never greater than the harm. Allowing
the possibility that c > h would generate situations where at least one individual should not take
care in addition to cases in which the accident should efﬁciently occur as both individuals have
costs of care higher than harm. Strictly speaking, these cases are of unilateral-care type, as at most
only one party can prevent the accident at a cost lower than the harm; thus, they fall outside the
scope of this article. By imposing c < h, the focus of our study is conﬁned to the problem of making
the least-cost avoider take care. If the wrong party is picked, no accident occurs, but prevention is
more expensive than optimal. If we allow for c > h the focus slightly changes and encompasses
situations in which the problem is indeed one of not avoiding the accident altogether.
30. On this interpretation of the social function of tort liability, see Calabresi (1970) and Brown
(1973), who were somewhat anticipated by Holmes (1881). For a more general perspective, see
Shavell (1987).
31. For example, they might be a motorist and pedestrian in a trafﬁc accident context or a doctor
and a simple bystander in a rescue case.
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accident cost and is calculated as the magnitude of the accidental loss, h, times
the probability that an accident occurs, which is given by the product of the
probabilities that each party does not take care, that is, the probability mass associated with costs of care greater than thresholds c1 and c2, respectively. Note
that this formulation portrays the case in which duplicative effort is wasteful.
If parties move simultaneously, the socially optimal thresholds of care minimize equation (1). The ﬁrst-order conditions for equation (1) with respect to c1
and c2 yield that the socially optimal thresholds depend on the shape of the
distributions and satisfy32:
c1* ¼ ð1  F2 ðc2*ÞÞh;
c*
2 ¼ ð1  F1 ðc*
1 ÞÞh:

ð2Þ

The economic interpretation of the interior solution described by equation
(2) is straightforward. The marginal increase in expected prevention costs from
setting a higher threshold should equal the marginal beneﬁt from reducing the
probability of accidents. At least one solution to equation (2) exists by direct
application of Brouwer’s ﬁxed-point theorem. However, there is no guarantee
that such a solution is unique. In fact, we can easily show that the set of solutions to equation (2) is not necessarily a singleton: simply consider the corner
solutions ðc1* ¼ 0; c2* ¼ hÞ and ðc1* ¼ h; c2* ¼ 0Þ, both satisfying equation (2).
Finally, a symmetric solution c1* ¼ c2* might be possible.33
To illustrate, consider the simplest case in which the parties’ costs of care
are uniformly distributed. In this case, f1(c) ¼ f2(c) ¼ 1/h, and F1(c) ¼ F2(c) ¼
c/h. The solution to the minimization problem is given by any c1* and c2* such
that c1* þ c2* ¼ h, since the social cost in expression (1) becomes



c2
c2
Sðc1 ; c2 Þ ¼ 2h1 þ 2h2 þ 1  ch1 1  ch2 h ¼ h=2.34 If the distribution is skewed
to the left or to the right, the optimal thresholds will also change, and different
local minima might yield different levels of the social cost. For example, if
party 2’s costs are uniformly distributed between 0 and h/2, it can be shown

@S
32. The ﬁrst-order conditions of equation (1) are @c
¼ f1 ðc1 Þ½c1  ð1  F2 ðc2 ÞÞh ¼ 0 and
1
¼ f2 ðc2 Þ½c2  ð1  F1 ðc1 ÞÞh ¼ 0, from which equation (2) follows. The second-order sufﬁcient conditions should be veriﬁed to make sure that the interior solution to equation (2) is a minimum and not a maximum or a saddle point. They are satisﬁed as long as f1(c1)f2(c2)h2 < 1. An
interior solution satisfying
equation
(2) will be optimal and preferred to corner solutions as long as
Ðh
Ðh
Sðc1*; c2*Þ  minf 0 cf1 ðcÞdc; 0 cf2 ðcÞdcg:
33. The necessary condition for a symmetric solution is that F2 ½ð1  F1 ½c1*Þh ¼
F1 ½ð1  F2 ½c1*Þh, which is trivially satisﬁed when the distributions are the same.
34. Alternatively, suppose the costs for party 2 are uniformly distributed between [bh, (1 
cbh
1
, and F2 ðcÞ ¼ ð12bÞh
. It is the case that party 1’s distribution
b)h], with b 2 [0, 1/2), f2 ðcÞ ¼ ð12bÞh
is a mean-preserving spread of party 2’s distribution, that is, both have the same expected value, but
the variance of the distribution is strictly greater for party 1 than for party 2. Simple computation
shows that, besides the two corner solutions, there is only an interior solution given by
c1* ¼ c2* ¼ h=2 for any b 2 (0, 1/2). In the limit case such that b ¼ 0, we are back to the ﬁrst
example where costs of care are symmetrically distributed.
@S
@c2
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that the optimal solution is the corner solution ðc1* ¼ 0; c2* ¼ hÞ, since the costs
for party 2 are expected to be lower than those for party 1.
It is easy to see that, under any distribution, the second-best socially optimal
thresholds of care can always be implemented by regulation, even if the parties’ costs of care cannot be veriﬁed ex post by the police or by a regulatory
body. In fact, a ﬁne set equal to these thresholds induces parties to take care if
care costs less than the ﬁne and to bear the ﬁne otherwise and only requires the
enforcer to verify whether or not parties have taken care but not their costs.
Formally, a ﬁne of magnitude /i will induce party i to take care for any c  /i.
Hence, ﬁnes /i ¼ c*i ; for i ¼ 1, 2 will induce the second-best outcome.35 A
similar approach is often referred to as a strict-liability type of enforcement, as
ﬁnes are levied irrespective of the parties’ costs of compliance. The same result
may be reached by a fault-based type of enforcement, under which parties pay
the ﬁne only if compliance costs less than the ﬁne.36
Finally, note that our approach applies not only to accidents with an injurer
and a victim, both of whom can take care, but also to accidents with two
injurers, who can take care, and a third party, a passive victim, who cannot
take any care but suffers harm. Under the liability rules discussed below, both
interpretations of the model are equivalent. The regulatory approach, instead,
requires that parties face the possibility to pay ﬁnes but do not bear the harm
resulting from the accident. This implies that injurers should not be liable in
tort, and victims, if active, should have ﬁrst-party insurance.
2.1 The Least Cost Avoider Approach with Simultaneous Moves

The least-cost avoider approach requires that liability be allocated entirely to
the party with the lowest cost of care, and thus, the courts must be able to verify
ex post the parties’ costs of care. Since such costs are not observable ex ante,
the parties do not know each other’s costs of care at the time of the accident and
they will decide whether to take care according to their expectations to pay
damages, as in a traditional Nash-Cournot setting.
When parties move simultaneously without observing each other’s decisions, a party will take care if his or her care costs are lower than or equal
to the expected liability costs; that is, a party will take care if his or her cost
of care is below a certain threshold ĉi and will not take care otherwise. The
thresholds for party 1 and party 2 are such that:
ĉ1 ¼ ð1  F2 ðĉ2 ÞÞð1  F2 ðĉ1 ÞÞh;
ĉ2 ¼ ð1  F1 ðĉ1 ÞÞð1  F1 ðĉ2 ÞÞh:

ð3Þ

The right-hand sides of equation (3) describe the expected liability of a party.
Party 1 is liable only under two conditions: party 2 does not take care
35. As usual, we assume that ﬁnes are costless to enforce. If not, the second-best levels of care
would have to be determined taking into account enforcement costs.
36. Concerning the economic theory of strict liability versus negligence, see Shavell (1980) on
tort law and Polinsky and Shavell (2000) on public enforcement of law.
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(otherwise there is no accident), which occurs with probability 1  F2(c2), and
party 2’s cost of care c2 is greater than or equal to party 1’s cost c1, which
occurs with probability 1  F2(c1).37 The same applies to party 2.
By comparing equations (2) and (3), we can note that ĉi will typically be less
than c*i for both i ¼ 1, 2, as 1  Fi(c) < 1; hence, the least-cost avoider approach does not attain the second-best optimum. It also impedes corner solutions discussed previously.38 Therefore, we can unambiguously say that the
liability approach cannot yield the second-best outcome.39

2.2 Sharing Irrespective of Fault with Simultaneous Moves

Another possibility under liability is to share the loss between the parties
according to shares r and 1  r for party 1 and party 2, respectively. The
shares depend neither on whether parties were at fault nor on who is the
least-cost avoider. As we explained in Section 1, sharing the loss among
the parties upon fault according to a comparative negligence rule necessarily
embeds a least-cost avoider approach.
On the contrary, here we examine the effects of sharing that does not take into
account the costs of the parties’ care and, thus, the shares are determined ex ante
and applied ex post irrespective of the parties’ behavior. Similar to the previous
section, parties will take care as long as their costs are lower than or equal to
their expected liability. In a sense, this approach resembles ﬁnes but it is more
constrained because the sum of the parties’ shares always amounts to 1 and thus
the sum of the costs up to which parties are willing to take care cannot be greater
than h.40 This restriction is not present in a regulatory approach. Therefore, as
our results will show, sharing irrespective of fault is inferior to ﬁnes. When
parties move simultaneously, their reaction functions are as follows:
ĉ1 ¼ ð1  F2 ðĉ2 ÞÞrh;
ĉ2 ¼ ð1  F1 ðĉ1 ÞÞð1  rÞh:

ð4Þ

37. We can disregard the instance of the two costs being equal as it does not affect the result.
38. Moreover, we can also see that the least-cost avoider approach will ensure ĉ1 ¼ ĉ2 when
costs are symmetrically distributed which was shown not to be necessarily optimal in the previous
section.
39. Consider the example with a symmetric
uniform distribution introduced earlier. Easy calpﬃﬃﬃ
culations show that ĉ1 ¼ ĉ2 ¼ hð3  5Þ=2 which is clearly less than the second-best solution.
40. This is clearly not true if liability is decoupled, that is, if the damages paid by the injurer and
the compensation received by the victim diverge. Decoupling liability consists of adding ﬁnes or
subsidies to damages and in fact amounts to a (partially) regulatory solution. In our model, perfectly set decoupled liability would yield the same outcome as a regulatory approach. Polinsky and
Che (1991) advocate decoupling in relation to the incentives to take care and to litigate; Kahan and
Tuckman (1995) discuss the decoupling of punitive damages under ‘‘special levy’’ statutes and
extend the conclusions reached by Polinsky and Che (1991) for the case in which litigation effort
varies with litigation stakes; Choi and Sanchirico (2004) reach an opposite result and revise the
desirability of decoupling liability; Lewis and Sappington (1999) relate decoupling to the judgment
proof problem.
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The right-hand sides to equation (4) describe the expected cost of liability.
Each party is liable for only a fraction of the harm and in only those cases
in which the other party does not take care (otherwise there is no accident).
It is easy to see that ĉi will generally be lower than c*i , for both i ¼ 1, 2, because
we cannot have r ¼ 1 and 1  r ¼ 1 simultaneously, except when corner
solutions are optimal. By setting r ¼ 1, we would have ĉ1 ¼ h and ĉ2 ¼ 0.
The other possible corner solution will result when r ¼ 0. In fact, sharing
irrespective of fault only works if courts do not have to make comparisons
and can make one of the parties fully liable for the accident.41 Putting aside
this situation that is contrary to the notion of sharing, we can say that the
second-best solution is not achieved.42

2.3 Precaution Cost Liability with Simultaneous Moves

Under precaution cost liability, the least-cost avoider is not only liable for the
harm he fails to prevent (if an accident occurs) but also for the care costs incurred by the other party (if no accident occurs). When parties move simultaneously, their decisions whether or not to take care may be formalized as
follows. Let us ﬁrst consider the cost of not taking care. The expected costs
party 1 and party 2 bear if they do not take care are, respectively, given by:
Ðh
cdF2 ðcÞ
;
ð1  F2 ðc1 ÞÞð1  F2 ðĉ2 ÞÞh þ ð1  F2 ðc1 ÞÞF2 ðĉ2 Þ c1
1  F2 ðc1 Þ
Ðh
ð1  F1 ðc2 ÞÞð1  F1 ðĉ1 ÞÞh þ ð1  F1 ðc2 ÞÞF1 ðĉ1 Þ

c2

cdF1 ðcÞ

1  F1 ðc2 Þ

:

The ﬁrst term is the same as under the least-cost avoider approach: party 1
(who does not take care) pays the harm if and only if he or she turns out
to be the least-cost avoider and if party 2 does not take care either. In addition,
as indicated by the second term, party 1 may be held liable for the care costs
borne by party 2 if party 1 is the least-cost avoider, with probability 1  F2(c1),
and party 2 has taken care, with probability F2 ðĉ2 Þ; the expected care costs
borne by party 2 are calculated as the average costs of care for party 2 conditional on the fact that such costs are higher than the costs of care for party 1

41. Bar-Gill and Ben-Shahar (2003:438) seem to make a similar point, but they refer to the
ordinary use of the comparative negligence doctrine, under which the parties’ shares are functions
of their levels of care. As we have already noted, in this case the optimal share of the least-cost
avoider is always equal to one (thus, the other party’s share is equal to zero) and in fact sharing does
not take place. We have examined this approach in the previous section. In this section, we refer
instead to a different use of the principle of sharing and note that it only replicates the outcome
assured by regulation in the case of optimal corner solutions, a point not made in the literature.
42. Consider the example with a uniform
distribution discussed previously. The solution is
ð1rÞ2
r2
h and ĉ2 ¼ 1rð1rÞ
h. Clearly, their sum is less than h for 0 < r < 1,
given by ĉ1 ¼ 1rð1rÞ
and hence, they are not socially optimal. The magnitude of the underprevention will be most signiﬁcant when r ¼ 1/2.
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(as party 1 is the least-cost avoider). The same reasoning applies to party 2.
Consider now the situation where a party takes care. The expected costs party 1
and party 2 bear if they take care are, respectively, given by:
Ðh
cdF2 ðcÞ
;
ð1  F2 ðc1 ÞÞc1 þ ð1  F2 ðc1 ÞÞF2 ðĉ2 Þ c1
1  F2 ðc1 Þ
Ðh
ð1  F1 ðc2 ÞÞc2 þ ð1  F1 ðc2 ÞÞF1 ðĉ1 Þ

c2

cdF1 ðcÞ

1  F1 ðc2 Þ

:

Contrary to the previous cases, on the one hand, party 1 does not always bear
his or her cost, this cost is refunded by party 2, if party 2 is the least-cost
avoider, and hence is borne by party 1 only with probability 1  F2(c1)
and, on the other hand, he or she might also bear the care costs of party 2,
if party 1 is the least-cost avoider, with the same probability seen before,
and if party 2 has taken care, with probability F2 ðĉ2 Þ. Again, the same applies
to party 2.
The decision whether or not to take care is taken by comparing the two previous expressions. It is instructive to note that liability for the other party’s care
costs appears in both expressions. This is because, say, party 1 is held liable for
party 2’s care costs only on the basis of whether party 1 is the least-cost avoider
and party 2 took care. Thus, precaution cost liability occurs irrespective of
whether party 1 took care and thus appears on both sides of the expression
(and, consequently, cancels out). Simplifying, we have:
ĉ1 ¼ ð1  F2 ðĉ2 ÞÞh;
ĉ2 ¼ ð1  F1 ðĉ1 ÞÞh:

ð5Þ

By comparing equations (2) and (5) it is easy to see that parties under precaution cost liability take care up to the socially (second best) optimal thresholds.
The intuition behind this result is as follows. The shortcoming of the least-cost
avoider approach is that a party’s care has a positive external effect on the other
party’s liability; this positive effect is not internalized and thus reduces the
parties’ willingness to take care. Precaution cost liability perfectly internalizes
such externalities, by obliging the least-cost avoider to pay either the accident
cost or the other party’s care costs. This way, the parties’ private incentives to
take care are aligned with the social goal of minimizing the total accident cost.

2.4 Ex Ante Optimal Negligence Rule with Simultaneous Moves

Under the least-cost avoider approach described above, the liability rule is
based on information available ex post to the court; the outcome does not coincide with the second best because this information was not available ex ante
to the parties. One might expect that an efﬁcient outcome could be reached by
implementing a negligence only based on the information available ex ante.
Let cdi be the due-care standard for party i. As it typically happens in
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a negligence rule, the parties will comply with the negligence standards only if
the cost of doing so is lower than their expected liability. To calculate the
expected liability costs, note that each party knows that if the other party’s
costs are above the negligence standard, that party will not be liable and hence
will not take care. In this case, failure to take care results in full liability for the
accident. However, if the other party’s costs are below the negligence standard
and neither of them takes care, the harm will be shared, according to a general
rule, c and 1  c, for party 1 and party 2, respectively. Obviously, no party has
an incentive to take care beyond the negligence standard.43 Deﬁne c1 and c2 to
be the thresholds above which party 1 and party 2, respectively, do not take
care aiming at free riding on the other party’s care. The parties’ reaction functions are:
c1 ¼ ð1  F2 ðcd2 ÞÞh þ ðF2 ðcd2 Þ  F2 ðc2 ÞÞch;
c2 ¼ ð1  F1 ðcd1 ÞÞh þ ðF1 ðcd1 Þ  F1 ðc1 ÞÞð1  cÞh:

ð6Þ

The ﬁrst terms on the right-hand sides depict the cost of unilateral negligence,
that is, the cost borne by a negligent party when the other party is nonnegligent
because his or her costs of care were above the negligence standard. In this
case, the negligent party pays the full harm. The second terms depict instead
the cost born by a party when also the other party is negligent. In this case the
loss will be shared. By rearranging the terms, the parties’ reaction functions
can be expressed as follows:
c1 ¼ ð1  F2 ðc2 ÞÞh  ðF2 ðcd2 Þ  F2 ðc2 ÞÞð1  cÞh;
c2 ¼ ð1  F1 ðc1 ÞÞh  ðF1 ðcd1 Þ  F1 ðc1 ÞÞch:
It is easily shown that the equilibrium in equation (6) is similar to that in equation (2) when the negligence standards are set equal to the second-best standards, c1* and c2*. Thus, a negligence rule that only makes use of information that
was available ex ante mimics the outcome of regulation. Note also that this
result holds true for any value of c, conﬁrming a well-known theorem in
the economic analysis of tort law.44
43. Note that varying c from 0 to 1 covers simple, comparative, and contributory negligence.
Similar considerations can be made for negligence rules based on strict liability. It is easy to verify
that the allocation of the residual burden—that is, the liability for accidents that occur when no
party is negligent because both parties’ costs are above the negligence standards—does not affect
the results proven in the text if the negligence standards are optimally set. This is because, when
a party takes due care, the other party, who is bearing the residual burden, will take care up to
ci ¼ ð1  Fj ðcdj ÞÞh, which is similar to equation (2) if cdj ¼ c*j . In the setting with two injurers,
simple, comparative, and contributory negligence allocate the residual burden to the passive victim, whereas strict-liability rules with some negligence defense result in the residual burden being
shared among the injurers. In the setting with an injurer and a victim instead the residual burden
necessarily falls on either of them.
44. Namely, that all negligence rules are equivalent with respect to the incentives to take care.
See Landes and Posner (1980).
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Nevertheless, somewhat anticipating considerations that we will make in
section 4, this is no longer true when parties are not identiﬁable ex ante in
the sense that they may look identical at the outset. Think, for example, of
an accident between two cars. It is easy to allocate liability entirely to one
party after the accident according to some predeﬁned criterion. The problem,
however, is that such a criterion should be predictable by the parties before the
accident takes place. If, for example, liability is allocated to the party that suffers the larger loss, parties may be uncertain about the relative size of their
future loss. Likewise, if liability is allocated to the one with the lower costs
of care, parties may only have probabilistic expectations on the other parties’
costs. The fact that parties are identiﬁable ex post is evidently not enough as
they take care decisions before the accident. In this case, not only should the
negligence standards be set at the same level cdu for both parties but also the
sharing of the loss will also be equal because any unequal nominal sharing will
anyway amount to c ¼ 12 in expectation, as parties do not know on which side
they will be ex post.45 When parties are unidentiﬁable ex ante, their care decision in equation (6) can be rewritten as:
1
c1 ¼ ð1  F2 ðc2 ÞÞh  ðF2 ðcdu Þ  F2 ðc2 ÞÞ h;
2
1
c2 ¼ ð1  F1 ðc1 ÞÞh  ðF1 ðcdu Þ  F1 ðc1 ÞÞ h:
2
By comparing the former expression to equation (13) in Section 4, it will be
easy to verify that an equilibrium c1 ¼ c2 ¼ c*u will not occur if cdu ¼ c*u and
damages equal to harm. In principle, incentives could be corrected by noncompensatory damages, in the case of two injurers and a passive victim, or
decoupled liability, in the case of an injurer and an active victim. However,
the tailoring of damages might require complex calculations in each individual
case and ultimately reproduce the identiﬁcation problem that makes it impossible to set individual negligence standards at the outset.

3. The Model with Sequential Moves
If parties move sequentially, the second mover observes whether or not the ﬁrst
mover has taken care.46 Recall, however, that costs of care are not observable.
Social policy can be improved by exploiting this information in order to avoid
that an accident occurs or that both parties take care. In the course of this analysis we will constantly assume that party 1 moves ﬁrst and party 2 second,
being evident that the roles can be reversed without prejudice to our results.

45. This is assuming the probability of being on each side is the same. Things change very little
if we relax this assumption.
46. If parties move sequentially but the second mover does not observe the ﬁrst mover’s move,
we are back to the simultaneous-move model.
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Using backward induction, we begin by analyzing the socially optimal decision of party 2, given the move of party 1.
It is immediately evident that the socially optimal strategy for party 2 is to
take care if party 1 did not take care (in fact, by assumption the cost for party 2
is lower than the harm) and not to take care if party 1 has already taken care (in
fact, the accident will not occur and additional care would only increase the
social cost). In other words, party 2’s care is a function of party 1’s previous
decision. We can now deﬁne the socially optimal care decision of party 1,
given the reaction function for party 2 described above. Since party 2 always
takes care whenever party 1 fails to do so, there will never be an accident.
Thus, the social cost is as follows

ð c1
ð h ð h
cdF1 ðcÞ þ
cdF2 ðcÞ dF1 ðcÞ:
ð7Þ
Sðc1 Þ ¼
0

c1

0

The social cost minimization problem is one of deciding whether the care costs
should be borne by party 1 or by party 2, subject to the condition that party 2
will always do the opposite of party 1. In turn, party 1’s optimal decision consists of taking care if his or her cost is less or equal to the expected cost for
party 2. From the ﬁrst-order condition for the minimization of equation (7)
with respect to c1, we ﬁnd that the socially optimal thresholds for c1 and
c2 depend again on the shape of the distribution functions and satisfy47:
ðh
s
c1* ¼ cf2 ðcÞdc;
0

s
0 ifc1  c*
1
s
c2* ¼
ð8Þ
s:
h ifc1 > c1*
It is evident that a solution exists and is unique for any distribution function.
Furthermore, a corner solution is never efﬁcient for party 1, but could be efﬁcient for party 2.48 As we have shown for the simultaneous-move model, also
s
in this case ﬁnes /i ¼ c*i for i ¼ 1, 2 will induce the second-best outcome. The
other considerations already made also apply.

3.1 The Least Cost Avoider Approach with Sequential Moves

Under the least-cost avoider approach it is evident that if party 2 observes that
party 1 has taken care, party 2 will not take any care, and this is optimal. Nevertheless, if party 2 has observed that party 1 has not taken care, party 2 will not
always take care, but will do so only if the costs of care are lower than or equal
47. The hﬁrst-order
i for the minimization of equation (7) with respect to c1 yields
Ð h condition
¼ f1 ðc1 Þ c1  0 cf2 ðcÞdc ¼ 0, from which the ﬁrst line in equation (8) is derived. The
second-order condition is clearly satisﬁed at the optimum.
48. Take the example developed in the previous subsection with symmetric uniform distribus
s
tion of care costs, we
have c1* ¼ h=2 and c2* is h if c1 > h/2 and zero otherwise, where equation (7)
c21
c1
h
becomes Sðc1 Þ ¼ 2h þ 2  2 .
@S
@c1
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to the expected liability, which depends on the probability to be the least-cost
avoider. Unlike under simultaneous moves, the fact that party 1 has not taken
care is a signal of his or her true costs of care. Thus, party 2 takes this fact into
consideration when calculating his or her expected liability. Party 1, in turn,
will anticipate party 2’s reaction while deciding on his or her care. In a sense,
party 1 is a Stackelberg leader taking into account the follower’s reaction function. Party 1, thus, will compare the costs of care with the expected liability as
already in equation (3), whereas party 2 will react to that choice, after observing party 1’s behavior. Thus:
ĉs1 ¼ ð1  F2 ðĉs2 ÞÞð1  F2 ðĉs1 ÞÞh;
(
0
ifc1  ĉs1
s
ĉ2 ¼ 1F1 ðĉs2 Þ
s :
1F1 ðĉs Þh ifc1 > ĉ1

ð9Þ

1

Party 2 never takes care if party 1 has already done so. Instead, if party 2
observes that party 1 has not taken care, he or she knows that the actual costs
of care borne by party 1 are necessarily higher than ĉs1 . Otherwise, party 1
would have taken care. By incorporating the signal sent by party 1, party 2
recognizes that his or her probability of being liable is higher than otherwise,
since it is the conditional probability of c1 > ĉs2 given that c1 > ĉs1 .
From equation (9), it is quite clear that ĉs1 < ĉs2 .49 The economic rationale is
that player 2 knows that if player 1 did not take care it is because his or her care
costs are reasonably high, thus player 2 is more willing to take care since there
is a higher-than-otherwise probability of being liable for the accident. The
same logic explains why also ĉ2 < ĉs2 must be true, that is, party 2 is more
willing to take care if he or she has observed party 1’s move than if both parties
move simultaneously. Conversely, we have ĉ1 > ĉs1 , that is, party 1 is less willing to take care when parties move sequentially than when they move simultaneously, since in the former case he or she can rely to some extent on the fact
that party 2 will take care in his or her place and hence there will be no accident
to pay for.50
3.2 Sharing Irrespective of Fault with Sequential Moves

If liability is allocated according to ﬁxed shares, the parties’ care decisions are
as follows:
1F ðĉs Þ

49. Note that if ĉs1  ĉs2 were true, then we would have 1F11 ðĉ2s Þ  1 and thus, from equation (9),
1
 h; ĉs2 > h is evidently impossible; ĉs2 ¼ h would imply ĉs1 ¼ 0 which is in turn incompatible
s
s
s
s
with the premise that ĉ1  ĉ2 . Therefore ĉ1  ĉ2 is impossible and thus the opposite must always
hold true.
50. Consider
distribution
case.pEasy
pﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ again the uniform
pﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
ﬃ
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ computations will show that
ĉs1 ¼ ð1  1=2Þh and ĉs2 ¼ 2ð1  1=2Þh if c1 > ð1  1=2Þh and zero otherwise. The private
care decision by party 1 is less than the second-best solution; however, the private choice by party 2
could actually be above the second-best solution. In fact, expressions (8) and (9) are generally
different. Also, note that with the least-cost avoider approach there is the possibility that an accident actually takes place.
ĉs2
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0
ifc1  ĉs1
:
ĉs2 ¼
ð1  rÞh ifc1 > ĉs1

253

ð10Þ

If party 2 has observed that party 1 has not taken care, he or she will take care
only if its costs are below his or her share in the harm. Party 1 will therefore
take this reaction into account ex ante and discount the probability of party 2’s
care from his expected liability. As under simultaneous moves, sharing fails to
achieve the second-best outcome. Note that an accident can actually take
place.51

3.3 Last Clear Chance

Under this doctrine the party who has the last chance to avoid the accident
bears the accident loss. Therefore, the doctrine only refers to accident contexts
in which parties move sequentially. In this case, the second mover bears the
whole cost if an accident takes place. Party 1 anticipates party 2’s decision and
will compare the costs of care with the expected liability given the probability
that party 2 does not take care times zero compensation (since party 2 is fully
liable). As to party 2, the observation that party 1 has not taken care is irrelevant, since he or she knows that, if there is an accident, he or she will be fully
liable. Therefore, trivially, we have:
ĉs1 ¼ 0;
ĉs2 ¼ h:

ð11Þ

This rule is not efﬁcient since equation (11) is clearly different from equation
(8). In fact, the last clear chance doctrine will simply implement a highly inefﬁcient solution due to the moral hazard behavior by party 1. However, it
should be recognized that no accident takes place.

3.4 Precaution Cost Liability with Sequential Moves

In this section we study a different version of the precaution cost liability that
we analyzed in the case of simultaneous moves. In this case, we need to take
into account the fact that the move of party 1 is observed by party 2. The optimal precaution cost liability rule requires that if party 1 does not take care, he
or she refunds the costs of care eventually borne by party 2. Party 2, in turn, is
liable for the accident loss.
Under this rule, when party 2 observes party 1’s move, it is easy to see that
the optimal reaction for party 2 is to take care if party 1 has not taken care and
51. By making use of our example with uniform distribution, we can see that the solution is
zero
given by ĉ1 ¼ r2 h and ĉ2 ¼ ð1  rÞh if c1 > r2h and
pﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
ﬃ otherwise. We cannot achieve the
second-best solution under sharing; we can ﬁx r ¼ 1=2, thus achieving an efﬁcient solution
for party 1 or we can ﬁx r ¼ 0 and achieve an efﬁcient solution for party 2.
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not to take care otherwise. In fact, care costs will be refunded by party 1,
whereas the harm would be borne by party 2; therefore, if party 1 has not taken
care, it is optimal for party 2 to take care. On the contrary, if party 1 has already
taken care, care by party 2 comes at a private cost to party 2 but yields no
beneﬁt, since the accident will not occur due to party 1’s care; thus, if party
1 has already taken care, it is not convenient for party 2 to do the same. Party 1,
in turn, anticipates party 2’s decision and hence knows that if he or she does not
take care, he or she will have to reimburse party 2’s costs. Therefore, we have
that the parties’ decisions of whether to take care are as follows:
ðh
s
ĉ1 ¼ cf2 ðcÞdc;
0


0 ifc1  ĉs1
s
ĉ2 ¼
:
ð12Þ
h ifc1 > ĉs1
It is easy to see that equation (12) is as in the social optimum in equation (8).
Therefore, as in the simultaneous-moves case, precaution cost liability reaches
the second-best socially optimal outcome, by making both parties internalize
costs and beneﬁts of their care.

3.5 Ex ante Optimal Negligence Rule with Sequential Moves

As we have discussed above, under a negligence rule that implements secondbest standards, c*
1 and c*
2 , the parties will comply only if the cost of doing so is
lower than their expected liability. The problem here is that the second-best
standard for party 2 is h, that is, party 2 should take care if party 1 fails to do so.
Party 1 will obviously anticipate that party 2 takes care and will not take care.
Hence, second-best negligence standards will not succeed. This result is not
surprising because the second-best solution balances two conﬂicting goals.
One is the provision of optimal incentives, and the other is the optimal mitigation of losses. Party 2 should always take care when party 1 fails to do so in
order to fulﬁll the latter task, but this upsets the former. A standard negligence
rule cannot optimally balance these two goals.52

4. On the Feasibility of Optimal Least Cost Avoidance
In the previous sections we analyzed the incentive properties of ﬁnes and of
different liability rules in a theoretical setting. In this section we will ask the
question of whether the rules proposed can actually be implemented in practice
and what kind of information the regulator or the courts need to acquire. In
particular, we will ﬁrst discuss two different information requirements: knowledge of the parties’ cost distributions ex ante and veriﬁability of the parties’
actual costs of care ex post. We also comment on the incentives to obtain information about the care costs borne by the other party.
52. See note 24 above on this issue.
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Under ﬁnes, the regulator needs to know the distributions of the parties’
costs in order to be able to set the ﬁnes optimally and he or she also needs
to verify whether or not parties took care. It is evident that the strict-liability
approach (under which a ﬁne is levied whenever a party fails to take care) does
not require the enforcer to verify ex post the costs of care for individual parties.
Parties will individually choose whether or not to comply with the rule depending on whether their care costs are greater or less than the expected ﬁnes, also
considering the probability of apprehension. Fault-based ﬁnes, which are levied only if a party’s costs are less than the expected ﬁne, instead require regulators to verify also the parties’ costs and hence might not always be feasible,
or, at least, will involve some additional administrative costs.
Also under sharing irrespective of fault, as under ﬁnes, the regulator needs to
know the distribution of the parties’ types in order to set the shares optimally,
but can ignore the actual costs of care of each party. Under the least-cost
avoider approach, instead, the courts do not need to know the distribution
of the parties’ types. However, it is crucial that the parties’ care costs be veriﬁable ex post, a task not strictly necessary under ﬁnes. Whether it is easier for
regulators to acquire information about the parties’ cost distributions ex ante or
for courts about the parties’ actual care costs ex post is difﬁcult to say and it
may depend on the accident context.
Precaution cost liability combines the informational requirements of the
least-cost avoider approach (the parties’ costs of care must be veriﬁable ex
post) and a requirement similar but not identical to the regulatory approach;
in fact, the distributions of the parties’ costs of care must be known ex ante to
the parties and not to the courts or to the regulator. However, this rule features
a characteristic absent in any other. Under ﬁnes, parties’ care choices are controlled at the moment when care decisions are taken, hence before the accident
occurs and irrespective of it. Under liability, courts normally intervene only if
an accident occurs and do nothing if either party takes care. Under precaution
cost liability, when an accident occurs courts allocate the costs of the accident,
but if no accident occurs courts also need to allocate the costs of care. This task
may be feasible in certain industrial or environmental accidents, or in rescue
cases—one example being Leebov53—but seems at ﬁrst sight to be utterly difﬁcult to implement in ordinary accident prevention. How can courts verify
whether the fact that a motorist slowed down before a crossing point really
avoided an accident that would have otherwise occurred? How can they possibly quantify the costs of care? For this reason, precaution cost liability, might
not be always a practical solution.54
The doctrine of last clear chance seems to be sui generis in this respect, as it
only requires courts to establish the order of the parties’ sequential moves and
whether or not the second mover could have done anything to prevent the

53. See the discussion in note 25 above.
54. On the applicability of marginal cost liability to contracts and property, see Wittman
(1981).
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accident, and it may be implemented irrespective of knowledge of the parties’
ex ante costs distributions and of their actual ex post costs of care.
A second problem to be distinguished may concern the possibility to identify the parties as party 1 and party 2 ex ante. Our analysis has so far been
conﬁned to instances in which the parties can be so identiﬁed; for instance,
they are a motorist and a pedestrian. Suppose instead that this is not possible,
they are both motorists or both pedestrians. The third-best policy should then
be to minimize expression (1) subject to c1 ¼ c2 ¼ cu since the standard cannot
be conditioned on the party’s characteristics.55 When parties are not identiﬁable ex ante, the optimal standard is:

f2 ðcu*ÞF1 ðcu*Þ þ f1 ðcu*ÞF2 ðcu*Þ
*
h:
ð13Þ
cu ¼ 1 
f1 ðc*
u Þ þ f2 ðc*
uÞ
The ﬁrst remark should be that a corner solution can never be optimal. The
second remark is that c*
u ¼ h=2 when Fi(h/2) ¼ 1/2 for both i ¼ 1, 2. As
an illustration, take again the example of costs2 uniformly
The so
distributed.
2
c
cial cost in expression (1) becomes Sðcu Þ ¼ hu þ 1  chu h. The solution to
the minimization problem is c*
u ¼ h=2. Due to the fact that parties cannot
be identiﬁed ex ante and are alike, the threshold should be the same for both
parties and equal to h/2.
In a regulatory setting, this solution would be easily achieved by a ﬁne
/ ¼ c*
u for both party 1 and party 2. As the model stands, all liability rules
would be inefﬁcient since none is able to replicate c*u . However, precaution
cost liability, despite the difﬁculties in its implementation, could solve the
problem and actually yield the second-best solution. In fact, under this rule
parties need to be identiﬁed ex ante as under ﬁnes, but their different distributions must be known by the parties themselves rather than by the regulator.
Therefore, the identiﬁcation problem, although it has the same consequences,
may occur under different conditions for the regulator (or the courts) and for
the parties, leaving some room for the implementation of different rules.
It could be that obtaining information about the costs borne by the other
party is socially optimal since at that point parties will have information concerning the least-cost avoider.56 However, transforming least-cost avoidance
into ‘‘least-cost acquisition of information’’ does not change the nature of the
problem. It can be easily shown that under the least-cost avoider approach, the
decision on whether or not to take care is essentially replaced by a decision on
whether or not to acquire information. Let us allow each party to ﬁrst decide
55. The ex ante identiﬁcation of the parties is likely to be a less serious problem in sequential
settings, as in these cases the order in which the parties move can be used as a way to distinguish
them.
56. Shavell (1992) considers the incentives to obtain information about risk. He shows that,
under strict liability, the injurer makes socially desirable decisions both with respect to information
and care for the familiar reasons. Under negligence rules, the outcome depends on which of several
possible rules apply. A complete negligence rule (a party is liable if he or she either failed to take
due care or failed to acquire information) is socially optimal, negligence rules where liability only
depends on the levels of care are generally inefﬁcient.
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whether or not to investigate the costs of the other party and then take care
decisions. We have assumed in Section 2.1 that if party 1 takes care, he or
she bears c1, and if party 1 does not take care, he or she faces an expected
cost ð1  F2 ðc1 ÞÞð1  F2 ðĉ2 ÞÞh. It has been deﬁned in equation (3) that ĉ1
is the critical threshold; party 1 takes care when c1 is less than this threshold;
party 1 does not take care otherwise.
We move backward to consider the decision to obtain information concerning the costs borne by party 2. If party 1 investigates, there is a probability, 1 
F2(c1), that he or she is the least-cost avoider and his or her expected payoff
will be c1(1  F2(c1)). If party 1 does not investigate, his or her expected payoff depends on whether he or she is below or above the threshold deﬁned in
equation (3). If below the threshold, investigation is always proﬁtable since, in
some cases, party 1 discovers that he or she is not the least-cost avoider. If
above the threshold, acquiring information is not always efﬁcient. Deﬁne
c1 such that c1 ¼ ð1  F2 ðĉ2 ÞÞh. If below the latter threshold, c1 2 ½ĉ1 ; c1 , information is acquired because sometimes party 1 discovers that he or she is the
least-cost avoider and can avoid liability by taking care. However, if above the
threshold, no investigation and no care is chosen by party 1. Essentially, when
party 1 expects party 2 to take care, there is no incentive to acquire information
to the same extent that there is no incentive to take care. Therefore, the tragedy
of common safety does not disappear when obtaining information about the
costs borne by the other party is costless.57

5. Conclusions
The problem of providing incentives through tort liability to two parties who
can alternatively prevent an accident is a commons problem. Each party will
try to free ride on the other party’s care. When both parties try to do so, accident prevention ends up being suboptimal. In this sense, accident prevention
becomes a tragedy of common safety. Allocating responsibility on the party
with the lower costs of care—the least-cost avoider approach—may not help,
since, as we have stipulated, parties may not know each other’s costs at the
time when they decide whether or not to take care.
We have shown that there are two solutions to this problem, both of them
helping to disentangle the commons problem. Fines target each party individually and ex ante, irrespective of whether or not an accident occurs. This way,
both the costs of care and their beneﬁts—the possibility to avoid the ﬁne—are
entirely private and hence no free riding arises. Contrary to ﬁnes, precaution
cost liability makes the least-cost avoider liable either for the accident loss, if
an accident occurs, or for the other party’s costs of care, if the accident has
been avoided by the other party. This way, parties again bear both the costs of

57. There are of course many situations where acquiring information about the costs borne by
the other party is extremely expensive and therefore it is possible that parties might actually prefer
to take care without acquiring prior information.
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care and its beneﬁt, and they are prevented from free riding on each other’s
care. A modiﬁed version of this rule applies to sequential moves contexts.
We have also shown that both ﬁnes and precaution cost liability achieve the
desirable outcome, where all other liability approaches fail. However, they
differ with respect to their actual feasibility. Whereas ﬁnes are a centralized
incentive device, which requires informed regulators, precaution cost liability
appears to be a more decentralized system, which requires informed parties.
Moreover, precaution cost liability requires courts to adjudicate a case even
when an accident did not occur, in order to allocate the costs of care. This task
may be not so difﬁcult to carry out in some cases, such as rescue, but it seems
utterly complex and, in fact, severely curbs the applicability range of this rule
in ordinary torts.
Our model analyzes a situation in which two injurers may prevent a loss
incurred by passive victims and when there is an injurer and a passive victim.
In the version with two injurers, resorting to regulation implies that injurers
face a ﬁne, whereas the accident loss is borne by the passive victim. In contrast,
when both injurers and victims’ incentives are considered, a rule of no liability
simply means liability of the victims,58 which may distort the incentive effects
of ﬁnes. Thus, in order to clear the victims from the effects of liability and
enable the functioning of ﬁnes, it may not be sufﬁcient to remove liability
in a legal sense, by denying any liability claim, but it is necessary to remove
liability in an economic sense, by actually removing the accident loss from all
parties involved in the accident. This result may be attained through public or
private insurance or any other means to prevent all parties from bearing the
accident loss. For this reason, when the problem is to provide incentives to
victims and injurers, rather than to injurers only, ﬁnes need to be complemented by an insurance coverage.59
We also analyzed several other liability rules and concluded that any liability rule other than precaution cost liability fails to solve the tragedy of common safety. This is because liability is normally exclusively triggered by the
occurrence of the accident. Thus, each individual party’s liability costs are
inescapably dependent on the other party’s care decision. Since one party’s
care, by concurring to avoid the accident, also reduces the prospect of liability
for the other party, accident prevention is undersupplied under any standard
liability rule.
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